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ABSTRACT
This paper considers some of the challenges posed
to law enforcement agencies in post-modernity by
the emergence of transnational criminal networks.
Law enforcement, once very much local in charac-
ter, must now reshape its structures and processes
to meet the new and emerging risks presented.
Though the paper uses the topic of illegal immi-
gration to reveal something of the nature of such
networks and the threat they pose, it also observes
that fundamentally, transnational criminal net-
works are profit-driven and that, perhaps, it is
misguided to think of these groups either as
commodity-specific or process-specific. The paper
concludes that law enforcement agencies need to
meet the challenge that such networks present by
managing their business with equal flexibility
and resourcefulness. Though mechanisms to sup-
port that business are being developed, law
enforcement agencies must not lose sight of the
fact that it is successful outcomes, in the form of
the dismantling and disruption of transnational
criminal networks, rather than the new processes
themselves (that simply underpin law enforce-
ment's efforts) that are important.
INTRODUCTION
Any discussion of criminal networks and
illegal immigration takes place against the
backdrop of the wider immigration debate.
In the UK, as across much of Europe,
immigration is an emotive and heavily
politicised subject. Opposing views on
whether immigration is a good or a bad
thing have become entrenched and despite
the current Government's efforts to high-
light this country's proud history of wel-
coming refugees fleeing persecution in their
own countries, the reality of the UK's
demographic deficit and its need for immi-
grants to supplement a declining, ageing
workforce, many in the country hold to the
view that the current level of immigration
is bad because ultimately it will bring social
unrest and put further strain on what is
perceived as an increasingly firail
infrastructure.
Whilst recognising that this complex
backdrop exists, this paper takes an instru-
mental approach and focuses its attention
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on illegal immigration which, all too
plainly, is a bad thing, not only because it is
contrary to law but also because of the
human misery and suffering it causes. Illegal
immigration strengthens and sustains crimi-
nal networks many of which can now claim
influence across the globe which is partic-
ularly significant in the context of this
paper. This paper draws on the authors
experiences, so has a particular UK bias, but
it is hoped that the core themes explored
will be familiar to many engaged in law
enforcement both within and beyond these
shores.
THE THREE AGES OF MODERN
POLICING
Combating the activities of criminal net-
works is difficult. Many crimes today pres-
ent law enforcement agencies with a new
set of challenges that often require innova-
tive responses. As Garland (2001) has noted
'the great forces of historical change'
including advances in technology, transport
and communications have 'transformed the
texture of the developed world in the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century' (p. 78).
Nowhere have these changes been more
keenly felt than in law enforcement.' Mod-
ern policing in the UK began with the
establishment of the Metropolitan Police in
London in 1829 but for the greater part of
the twentieth century, policing was very still
very much local in character. Police officers
lived in the areas that they were tasked with
patrolling. They were responsible for that
area and were expected to be a highly
visible physical presence; guardian and arbi-
ter often dispensing summary and expres-
sive justice. An extract from Hertfordshire
Constabulary's standing orders of 1898
emphasises this localism. Every constable
visiting the police station was obliged to
visit every prisoner in the cells; knowing
the faces of local 'villains' was considered
essential for effective policing.^ Many
remember an age before the mobile tele-
phone, but for much of the twentieth cen-
tury, officers did not have access to (now
considered essential) radio communications.
Even when radio equipment became more
widely available, doubts about its efficiency
meant that the Metropolitan Police con-
tinued to publish guidance to officers need-
ing their colleagues' assistance: blow three
times on their police whistle or at night,
shine their torch in the direction of other
police officers.''
The second half of the twentieth century
(a period now referred to by sociologists
such as Garland (2001) as 'late-modernity')
was characterised by the rapid advances in
technology, transport and communications
that were alluded to earlier. It has also
featured increasing crime rates and
increased opportunities for crime, reduced
situational controls and a relaxation of
informal controls in society in families and
in neighbourhoods. The police responded
by adopting a reactive policing style that
took police officers away from their com-
munities and put them into patrol cars to
provide a rapid response to emergency calls.
During this period the police generally wai-
ted for things to happen and then respon-
ded to events with their new 'scientific'
detection techniques.'* Relatively basic sci-
ence epitomised by techniques such as fin-
gerprinting or scene examination for tool
marks, hair or fibres or the collation of
intelligence reports on card indices or other
handwritten records gave way to more
sophisticated techniques such as DNA
examination and biometrics, computerised
databases and crime analysis, but the princi-
ples guiding police activity remained the
same. The police tended to react to events,
fulfilling their 'primary mandate of . . .
emergency order maintenance' (Reiner,
2000 p. 136). This discription is a little
simplistic because during this period an
embryonic, national, drugs and illegal
immigration unit emerged in the form of
Scotland Yard's Central Drugs Intelligence
and Illegal Immigration Unit (CDIIIU),
Regional Crime Squads were established
and developed and proactive teams of
detectives were based around the country
with a mandate to prevent and detect seri-
ous and organised crime. However, these
units represented only a very small fraction
of police operational resources.
The third phase from the beginning of
the 1980s up to the present day is charac-
terised by an information-soaked environ-
ment. Sociologists such as David Lyon
(1999) have suggested that society has
moved into the post-modern age while
others such as Giddens (cited in Gauntlett,
2002) have argued persuasively that the
phenomena that others have characterised
as 'post-modern' are usually just the more
extreme instances of a fully developed
modernity. Whichever school of thought
one subscribes to it is clear that the pace of
change has quickened. The growth of the
Internet has created new crimes (what has
come to be known as 'cyber-crime') and
facilitated the easier and faster commission
of many 'old' crimes. There are now more
than 50 million mobile telephones in use in
the UK and that number grows each day. A
large proportion of these are of the pay-as-
you-go variety — no self-respecting crimi-
nal would be without at least one. Text
messaging, almost unheard of twenty years
ago is now for many, the preferred form of
communication. This mass of communica-
tion and electronic data has created a 'data-
smog' or an 'information-bog'. During the
last two decades, criminal justice authorities
have had to reorient their practices in the
wake both of these internal and interna-
tional developments. In the policing sector
the result has been bifurcation; increasing
emphasis on the importance of more pro-
active, national structures to combat trans-
national crime but also an increasing
recognition of the importance of service
delivery; of meeting local needs by encour-
aging greater community involvement to
enhance problem-solving activities that
provide sustainable solutions to policing
problems. Though these may perceived to
be competing priorities one only need con-
sider the situation of many local commu-
nities facing drugs problems or gun crime
to begin to see links between organised
crime and local policing problems.
THE RISK SOCIETY AND THE RISK
ICEBERG
Ericson and Haggerty (1997) contend that
the police have become information bro-
kers to institutions such as insurance com-
panies and health and welfare organisations
that operate based on knowledge of risk. In
turn, these institutions influence the ways
that police officers think and act. These
institutions are part of an emerging 'risk
society' where knowledge of risk is used to
control danger. The current concern with
risk is a product of the information-soaked
environment, of globalisation and what it
brings; a sense of vulnerability in being part
of a world system. Globalisation has drawn
us out of our self-contained national or
local communities into a larger world that
offers none of the old protections. Often,
risks cannot be delimited spatially and are
becoming ever more difficult to manage
because of their global nature. In the past,
risks were largely perceptible: today the
risks are 'global, implicit in post-
industrialisation and in the main unseen'
(Coker, 2002). This notion of risk may be
depicted as an iceberg. Just as only a small
portion of an iceberg can be seen above the
waterline, so it is often the case that only a
small proportion of risks are identified and
managed to the satisfaction of decision-
makers; after all one can only plan strategies
to address the real (or at least, perceived)
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problems that face an organisation. The
greater part of the iceberg consists of risks
(or problems) that may have been identi-
fied, but are yet to be properly analysed or
assessed or, alternatively, as-yet-unidentified
risks that are 'ofF the radar' but nevertheless
suggest some vague notion of danger.
Clearly, effective risk management is vital
but the 'risk iceberg' analogy suggests that
in practice in the information bog of post-
modernity, those in law enforcement are
usually playing catch-up; rarely sure what is
just over the horizon. The US Secretary of
Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, has recently
provided a very personal view on the risk
iceberg model stating.
There are known knowns; there are
things we know that we know. There
are known unknowns; that is to say
there are things that we now know we
don't know but there are also unknown
unknowns — there are things we do
not know we don't know and each year
we discover a few more of those
unknown unknowns.^
Rumsfeld's comments were derided and
won him the 2003 'Foot in Mouth' award
from the Plain English Campaign for the
most nonsensical remark made by a public
figure, but to many employed in intelli-
gence work, Rumsfeld's comments do have
some resonance: they do seem to describe
the murky world within which intelligence
officers operate.^ Rumsfeld's statement is
more than an epistemological conundrum.
Intelligence agencies do hold data that are
applied by decision-makers to manage risk.
Sometimes intelligence gaps are identified
and may be addressed but there are often
things of which it would probably be to the
advantage of those same decision-makers to
know that they have no understanding. To
explain this further the problem of illegal
immigration to the European Union will be
considered.
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION TO THE
EUROPEAN UNION
There has always been illegal immigration.
Some individuals have been more enter-
prising and resourceful than others but in
the past such enterprises were essentially
small-scale; usually no more than 'cottage
industries' but now human smuggling and
human trafficking are big business. The
routes taken by migrants to enter the EU
are both well established and well known.^
These include the Baltic route, the Central
and Eastern European route, the Balkan
route, the Eastern Mediterranean route and
the North African route. The enlargement
of the EU free movement zone this year
brought the EU's borders closer to many
would-be migrants. More effective policing
(or at least, the promise of more effective
policing) in the EU Accession countries has
meant that the nexus points have moved
eastwards so that they are now situated in
Russia, Turkey and the Ukraine, but illegal
immigration to the free movement zone has
not been significantly reduced. Some
migrants may be legally entitled to resi-
dence while others obtain leave to remain
through marriage, by obtaining work, or as
genuine refugees but many others do not
meet the criteria to settle legally. Perhaps it
is wrong to infer that all migrants are immi-
grants (ie that they intend to settle in the
EU zone) as it is becoming increasingly
clear that many individuals periodically
return to the countries of their birth,* or are
simply transiting through Europe as a means
of reaching North America.' What is cer-
tain is that the majority of migrants
(whether ultimately successful or not in
their efforts to remain legally in a Member
State or to complete their journey to North
America) are usually unable to make their
journey to the West without assistance.
What is (or isn't) illegal immigration
probably needs no further explanation here
but human smuggling and human traffick-
ing take many forms and are often con-
fused. Human smuggling suggests a level of
planning and organisation that is usually the
preserve of criminal groups and implicit in
that term is that someone else, not the
individual being smuggled, is also benefit-
ing financially from that activity. Human
trafficking has been defined as including the
recruitment, transportation, transfer, har-
bouring or receipt of persons by means of
the threat or use of force or other forms of
coercion, fraud or deception . . . for the
purposes of exploitation (prostitution, sex-
ual exploitation, slavery, forced labour or
servitude).'°
The United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime has suggested that globally each
year, 500,000 to 700,000 people are traf-
ficked and that this evil trade earns criminal
gangs between $12and $20 billion annually
(2003)." Evidence seems to show that most
facilitation groups work within their own
ethnic or family background. Migrants may
be charged anything from (^^ 2,000 to
j{;20,000 to enter the UK depending on the
route travelled and the level of risk of
capture or discovery as assessed by the
smugglers (who usually carry out their own
dynamic risk analyses).^ ^ Experience has
shown that statistics are notoriously unreli-
able and it is suggested here that the
UNODC figures should be treated with
caution. That human trafficking is an
income and revenue generator for organised
crime groups a priori seems obvious, but the
annual trafficking figures provided seem
very high. As has been described in the
preceding paragraph, the term 'human traf-
ficking' has a particular meaning in this
context and in questioning the published
figures it is suggested that a proportion of
these numbers may relate to human smug-
gling rather than trafficking. It may be that
many cases are defined as trafficking rather
than smuggling because those arranging the
migrants' passage continue to exercise con-
trol over their charges even after they have
landed at their destination (either by col-
lecting money from the migrants them-
selves or from their families in their native
countries).'^ The important issue here is
that the smuggling/trafficking question is
more than mere semantics. Individuals
being trafficked are, very much, victims in
their own right and law enforcement agen-
cies must be able to differentiate between
the two in order to establish enforcement
strategies that meet the victims' needs as
well as the needs of the State.
There have been some extremely auda-
cious attempts to enter the UK illegally. For
example, in February 2000 nine Afghans,
armed with guns and grenades, seised an
aircraft on an internal flight from Kabul.
The aircraft eventually landed at Stansted
Airport near London where the hijackers
remained on board with most of their hos-
tages for 70 hours. Eventually they surren-
dered to police and were subsequendy
convicted of hijacking. However, in 2003,
the Appeal Court ruled that the convictions
were unsafe because the law relating to
whether the men had acted under duress
had been wrongly applied at their trial.
Consequently, all of the hijackers were
released. Before the aircraft landed in the
UK there was doubt about whether or not
this really was a hijack and even today the
whole question of whether this was a 'real'
hijacking or simply a mass immigration has
never properly been resolved. The fact is
that most of those aboard the aircraft,
whether suspected of being involved in the
execution or planning of the event or not,
remain in the UK today and the confusion
over whether or not those on board the
plane were victims or criminals, persists.
In another high-profile case, UK Cus-
toms officials found sixty Chinese migrants,
most already dead but many dying, when
they searched a lorry that had arrived at the
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port of Dover on 18 June 2000.^''Tragically,
the lorry driver had closed the only air vent
on the container to avoid detection by
immigration officials. Those who died were
found to have suffocated. The driver was
convicted of 58 counts of manslaughter and
jailed for 14 years. Four other men were
sentenced to six years' imprisonment in the
Netherlands for smuggling illegal immi-
grants into the UK. Despite this tragedy
migrants continue to be smuggled in lor-
ries. However, with the implementation of
more effective physical controls (such as the
use of CO2 monitors) the greater propor-
tion of individuals now entering the UK
illegally use much simpler methods. As
Western governments have implemented
more effective border controls so there has
been a marked increase in the use of stolen
or counterfeit travel documents to facilitate
illegal migration.
The experience of the police at Heath-
row Airport (the world's busiest airport,
handling in excess of 60 million passengers
annually) is that the majority of illegal
immigrants travel to the UK with docu-
ments. Counterfeit documents may be ten-
dered to immigration officials with intent
to deceive. Genuine (or, sometimes coun-
terfeit) documents that have enabled the
migrant to embark on his or her journey
are often disposed of prior to immigration
controls as a precursor to an application for
political asylum. Many migrants arrive in
the UK coverdy and then obtain a counter-
feit passport to facilitate onward travel or
assist in gaining employment. Parcels of
hundreds of counterfeit passports are reg-
ularly seized at UK ports in the possession
of couriers or are intercepted in the mail.'^
Commonly such documents have been
counterfeited in Thailand where there is a
thriving forgery and counterfeiting industry
although there are also a number of other
countries in Asia where the manufacture of
EU passports is a profitable business. At
Heathrow up to 50 individuals a week are
intercepted whilst attempting to enter the
UK with counterfeit documents. Most of
these individuals are facilitated into the
UK by criminal networks. Often, a mem-
ber of the network will accompany the
migrant on the flight. The facilitator then
relieves the migrant of his or her travel
document on arrival in the Member State
leaving him or her to apply for political
asylum. However, this is not the only
method used. In August 2004, the crew of
a Boeing 747 aircraft en route to Heath-
row from Bangkok discovered six extra
passengers. Unknown to the crew, the
men had earlier boarded the aircraft for an
internal flight but they had remained on
board by concealing themselves in a roof
panel in the rear of the aircraft. Their travel
and concealment had been assisted by a
member of a criminal network who was a
passenger on the aircraft. Subsequent
enquiries showed that in the preceding 10
months the same male had facilitated at least




The smuggling of migrants and human traf-
ficking by criminal networks are two of the
fastest growing problems facing EU Mem-
ber States. Much of the literature on serious
and organised crime describes the organisa-
tional forms at their heart as 'organised
crime groups' but as Williams (2003) has
noted: 'most criminal activities are initiated
by individuals or small groups and can best
be understood as "disorganised crime'".
This does not mean to suggest that 'orga-
nised crime' is a chimera. Certainly, crime
groups exist, but modern groups do not all
conform with the popular media-driven
image and in that regard it is probably more
accurate to describe them as criminal net-
works. As Williams (2003a) notes, a criminal
network is a 'highly sophisticated organisa-
tional form'. They have the capacity to
infiltrate the legal economy, undermine
public morals and neutralise law enforce-
ment through corruption at national,
regional and even global level. Such groups
are often characterised by significant link-
ages between people, places and events.
These networks pose the single greatest
challenge to border security. In many coun-
tries criminal networks have infiltrated both
private and public institutions and as a result
have blurred the line between licit and illicit
activity. For example, it is broadly accepted
that Russian criminal networks are active in
many neighbouring countries including,
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Georgia and
their reach extends into much of Europe
and North America. Infiltration of such
organisations is always difficult and often
impossible.^^ Prosecutions must be painstak-
ingly assembled and a characteristic of such
investigations is that they take a very long
time: during the investigation the group is
often able to operate successfully and rela-
tively unhindered.^^
Increasingly, criminal networks operate
across a range of markets and in multiple
jurisdictions. For example, Chinese crimi-
nal networks in Europe are involved in
human trafficking but they are also involved
in drug trafficking, money laundering and
the importation and sale of counterfeit
goods (NCIS 2004). Most of the illegal
immigration routes described above are also
weU-established drug-trafficking routes. In
that respect it is probably wrong to view the
problems that such networks create as 'the
immigration problem' or 'the drugs prob-
lem' or the 'counterfeit goods problem'.
What can be stated is that criminal net-
works are usually driven by profit motive
alone and are generators of crime in the
broadest sense. They require sophisticated
and well-coordinated organisational respon-
ses. Law enforcement agencies must work
together to deal effectively with these prob-
lems. Police may act as the 'information
brokers' described by Ericson and Haggerty
(1997) but crime networks are adept at
managing risk. Limiting damage to their
criminal enterprises and law enforcement
agencies worldwide must play a part if
established transnational criminal networks
are to be challenged effectively.
Before this paper suggests a response to
these problems it may be appropriate to
explain what were earlier referred to as the
unidentified problems in the context of
illegal immigration. In truth it is rather
difficult to select an example because, by
identifying them, they become 'identified
problems'. The term 'unidentified prob-
lems' here may perhaps be misleading but
what is implied is that the true nature of
the problems in the context of illegal
immigration and the threat to border secu-
rity may not be properly understood. Con-
sider the terrorist threat to the West. It may
seem strange to characterise this threat as
an unidentified problem, however in the
context of illegal immigration there may
be some merit in doing so. For example,
none of those involved in the 9/11 attack
could be considered to be illegal immi-
grants even though they made false
declarations to evade US immigration con-
trols. None of the individuals arrested in
the UK in any of the high profile counter-
terrorism operations in the last two years
entered the country illegally — indeed all
of the individuals arrested in the latest
incidents are British nationals. ^ ^ This poses
the questions: 'Is the terrorist threat to
border security the same as that posed to
national security?' and 'If these threats are
different then what should be the differ-
ence in the organisational response?'. It is
suggested that these kinds of questions
represent the 'unidentified problems' or the
'unknown unknowns' to which Donald
Rumsfeld was referring.^"
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ORGANISATIONAL RESPONSES AND
THE UK NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
MODEL
Sophisticated organisational responses are
required to answer these questions. Most
Member States' law enforcement agencies
have started to meet the challenge of trans-
national crime. Many of these responses are
being coordinated by the EU. Indeed, the
continuing development of the Schengen
arrangements, the growth of Europol and
increasing cooperation in the areas of justice
and home affairs, the EU and its Member
States are working hard to improve
intelligence-gathering and the co-
ordination of law enforcement activity. In
the area of illegal immigration, the EU has
established the Risk Analysis Centre (RAC)
which is based in Helsinki. The centre's
purpose is to conduct threat assessments and
risk analyses of illegal immigration and to
report on those findings for the benefit of
Member States.^'
The UK's response is the National Intel-
ligence Model (NIM) which was intro-
duced in January 2000 by the National
Criminal Intelligence Service. 'The model
is the collected wisdom and best practice in
intelligence-led policing and law enforce-
ment. It provides the picture that drives
effective strategy . . .' (NCIS 2000). Within
the context of the UK Police Reform
agenda the NIM is 'A Model for Policing'
to provide strategic direction, to make tac-
tical resourcing decisions about operational
policing and to manage risk (Home Office
2004). The key message that the Model
seeks to convey is that an accurate identi-
fication of current and emerging problems
is essential for timely and effective law
enforcement interventions. The aim is that
problems and risks are identified and
resources are targeted in areas that they can
be most effective. In other words the NIM
represents an attempt to ameliorate prob-
lems by doing the best thing on the balance
of the available evidence rather than just
doing something.
With criminal networks already identi-
fied as key drivers of crime at the national
and transnational level, the task now is to
identify the particular groups to be targeted
and to recommend intervention techniques
that offer the greatest chance of success. The
NIM's key intelligence product is the 'Stra-
tegic Assessment'. This document is an
evidence-based research package produced
by intelligence staff for senior managers.
The assessment draws upon a wide variety
of sources to produce an accurate picture of
the business. In the past, police intelligence
units tended to look no further than police
databases and indices, but with the advent
of the NIM intelligence staff are encour-
aged to take a much wider view and other
sources such as the UK Government, UN
and EU studies and reports, academic stud-
ies and research programmes and demo-
graphic studies are now utilised.
Standardised products and techniques mean
that intelligence packages are more readily
understood and can easily be circulated
around the law enforcement community.
This process should enable managers to
make more effective, evidence-based inter-
ventions at local, national and transnational
levels.
CONCLUSIONS
The UK is not alone in facing the challenge
of transnational criminal networks and the
NIM can only take UK law enforcement so
far. The challenge for law enforcement in
this country is to look far beyond the
borders of the UK and to work even more
effectively in partnership with its European
partners. The NIM provides a mechanism
for the coordination of UK law enforce-
ment activity but as Williams (2003) has
noted, to be successful 'governments and
law enforcement agencies have to think and
act much more in network terms; [and] to
develop the same kind of flexibility to act
both nationally and internationally through
the creation of transnational law enforce-
ment networks' based on professionalism,
trust and the free flow of intelligence. These
improvements can only be effected with the
further development of existing national
agencies and transnational structures such as
Europol and the RAC but equally bene-
ficial would be the development of a 'Euro-
pean Intelligence Model' committed to the
development of standardised intelligence
products that may more easily be exchan-
ged, understood and acted upon. What is
required is a focus on ends rather than
means; whichever system is selected, those
in law enforcement should not be satisfied
until they have discovered a few more of
those 'unknown unknowns' and to have
secured successful outcomes in the form of
the dismantling or at least disrupting of
transnational criminal networks. Only then
can law enforcement be said truly to be
making progress against criminal networks
and policing problems.
NOTES
(1) In this regard the paper builds on the
idea of the three eras of policing set
out by Brian Flood, The Head of
Corporate Development of the UK's
National Criminal Intelligence Serv-
ice in his paper 'Are we really serious
about intelligence . . . ?' delivered at the
National Crime Squad Headquarters,
Pimlico, on 14 July 2004.
(2) Standing Orders and Regulations for
the Government and Discipline of the
Police Force — published 1 January
1898. Retrieved 04/10/2004 from
http://police999.com/hphs/history/
150-03.html.
(3) From the, now defunct, Metropolitan
Police Instruction Book, at one time
mandatory reading for all new recruits
to the Service (incidentally, those
instructions were still in force in 1977
when this paper's author joined the
police service).
(4) Any number of books on the subject
may be found: White, PC. (2003).
Crime Scene to Court: Essentials of Foren-
sic Science. London: The Royal Society
of Chemistry is a good example.
(5) These comments were made by
Rumsfeld at a press briefing in
December 2002.
(6) Rumsfeld fought off stiff competition
for the award from actor turned Cal-
ifornia governor Arnold Schwarzeneg-
ger whose contribution to the gay
marriage debate was 'I think that gay
marriage is something that should be
between a man and a woman' and the
(then) European Commissioner Chris
Patten's contention that the British
Conservative Party had committed
political suicide and was now living to
regret it.
(7) Presentation by Tor Burman, Europol
Serious Crime Department, Crimes
against Persons Unit, Illegal Immigra-
tion Group, 14 September 2004,
Crime Intelligence and Risk Assess-
ment Conference, Finnish Frontier
Guard & Coast Guard School, Espoo,
Finland.
(8) It is not unknown for foreign nationals
fleeing persecution in their own coun-
tries and provided with UK travel
documents that preclude their travel to
those countries, to be discovered to be
using those documents to return to
neighbouring countries and then to
cross the land border to their homes.
(9) There have been a number of prosecu-
tions in the UK courts of airlines'
document checkers who had facili-
tated migrants with false documents
onto transatlantic flights. Perhaps the
most notable investigation was Opera-
tion 'Napa Valley' which was con-
ducted in 2000 by the police at
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Heathrow Airport. In 2002, three Air
Canada document checkers were con-
victed of facilitating 78 illegal immi-
grants to Canada.
(10) Article 3 of the UN Protocol to Pre-
vent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking
in Persons.
(11) United Nations Office on Drugs &
Crime 2003.
(12) UK Foreign and Commonwealth
Office 2003
(13) This phenomenon was really brought
to public consciousness by the plight
of the 20 Chinese migrant cockle
pickers who were drowned in More-
cambe Bay in the north of England in
February 2004 whilst attempting to
pick said cockles for which they were
being paid ;4!ilO per sack.
(14) UK Immigration and Nationality
Directorate CHINA Country Infor-
mation Bulletin 5/2003 — August
2003.
(15) AU preceding data in this paragraph
were obtained from an interview w i^th
a member of the MPS Human Smug-
gling Team, Heathrow Airport, Sep-
tember 2004.
(16) Based on the author's police
experiences.
(17) The author's recent experience of
teaching on a CEPOL course attended
by border guards from all of the EU
Member States suggests that it is more
accurate in this context to refer to
Russian organised crime groups as
'Russian-speaking organised crime
groups' as many originate from coun-
tries that were formerly members of
the Soviet Union rather than Russia
itself.
(18) Based on the author's police
experiences.
(19) In August 2004, 12 men were ar-
rested in London, Luton, Hertford-
shire and Lancashire on suspicion of




ber 2004, four men were arrested in
Brent Cross, North London on sus-
picion of a 'dirty bomb' plot.
Retrieved 10/10/2004 from http://
www.guardian. CO. uk/uk_news/story/
0%2C3604%2C 1313272%2C00.html
(20) To describe this in another way; a
problem or threat may also be uni-
dentified if it is not identified and
properly understood by those who
have the resources and capability to
deal with it.
(21) Threat Assessment — criminal pres-
sure towards the EU external borders;
risk analysis — vulnerabilities of soci-
ety and the EU external border secu-
rity system itself.
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